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Sara Copic
The Content of Consciousness: 
Do We Need Qualia?
  Philosophy is the practice of coming 
to understand that with which we believe 
we are most intimately familiar – our 
social norms, the golden rule, learning, 
our consciousness (to name just a few). Of course, there is 
a sense in which we are all familiar with and understand 
consciousness: we experience it in our normal waking life. To 
borrow from Thomas Nagel, each of us knows “what it is like” 
to experience the world from a certain point of view. However, 
experience of, does not necessarily yield insight into, and it is 
perhaps our very familiarity with consciousness that deludes us 
into believing we comprehend it. When we begin to question 
this phenomenon, the very thing that defines who we are, we 
uncover that we hardly know our own minds. 
 Therefore, it is not surprising that, “The greatest chasm 
in the philosophy of mind – maybe even all of philosophy 
– divides two perspectives on consciousness.” The point of 
contention revolves around the existence of qualia, or intrinsic 
qualities of our experience, and our purported awareness of 
them. In other words, the question, “Is there anything in 
phenomenal consciousness that escapes or goes beyond the 
intentional, cognitive, and functional?” has spurred great 
debate in recent times, and brought about two main theories 
to answer the question.
 These competing views are called intentionalism (or 
representationism) and phenomenism. Intentionalists claim 
that phenomenal conscious experiences, such as seeing 
red or feeling pain, are nothing more than intentional or 
representational mental contents. (There is a debate about the 
nature of this content, that is, whether it is “narrow” or “wide” 
content, a point which lies outside our scope.) In contrast, 
phenomenists argue that qualia (which, by definition, escape 
intentional, cognitive, and functional characterization) are 
real, and that we have first-person access to them. According 
to phenomenism, we can attend to and be aware of the vehicle 
of representation of our experiences, as well as of phenomenal 
characters that are intrinsic but do not represent anything. 
This paper will explore the chasm between intentionalism 
and phenomenism, and ultimately attempt a defense of the 
former. 
 First, let us develop a framework for our approach 
to consciousness, which is relatively uncontroversial in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. All of the topics discussed 
here will accord with physicalism, the idea that our universe 
only contains matter (atoms and their subparticles, bosons, 
and the like) and energy (fermions, light, etc.). Under the 
physicalist doctrine, all phenomena (including mental 
phenomena) must be accounted for without invoking other 
kinds of substances. Thus, while substance dualism (the idea 
that there are physical and mental substances which have 
different and mutually exclusive properties) is out, property 
dualism is still in the game. Hence, both an intentionalist and a 
phenomenist could be property dualists, holding the view that 
mental properties (thoughts, beliefs, phenomenal experience) 
are fundamentally irreducible to their physical realizers (Heil 
177). Since qualia preclude functional, cognitive, or intentional 
characterization, they must, if they exist, supervene on these 
mental properties. If qualia are real, supervenience would be 
true and intentionalism false (Block).
 Secondly, the philosophical debate over the putative 
existence of qualia and their first person accessibility is a parcel 
of a greater debate about a paradigm of the mental called 
functionalism. In functionalism, mental states are part of 
a causal network. For instance, if you stub your big toe on 
your bed post, you are most likely, under normal conditions, 
going to experience pain. According to functionalism, this 
pain state was caused by your tissue damage, and in turn 
causes pain behavior and avoidance behavior (perhaps you 
wince, rub your toe, and watch out for furniture in your 
path in the future). Here, pain acts as a causal intermediary 
between tissue damage and pain behavior (Kim). The qualia 
debate factors into this because philosophers want to know 
if our phenomenal experience, “what it is like” for a subject 
to experience something, can be characterized functionally. If 
not, functionalism would prove to be an incomplete picture of 
the mind’s workings. Here, we will focus more specifically on 
the qualia debate, though issues about functionalism will be 
embedded within the discussion.
 Several questions accompany the issues noted above. 
Are there such properties as qualia? If so, do we have first- 
person access to them, and how can we become aware of 
them? Why would qualia accompany or supervene on our 
conscious experiences (in a way, this question poses Chalmers’ 
“hard problem” in different terms)? What are the appeals of 
intentionalism versus phenomenism, or vice versa? How does 
each theory account for our phenomenal experience? What is the 
relationship between phenomenism and epiphenomenalism2? 
Finally, if qualia exist, do they present a serious challenge for 
functionalism? Here, the exploration of these issues will be 
guided by the views of Gilbert Harman and Ned Block, who 
represent intentionalism and phenomenism, respectively.
 There are three main arguments for qualia that Block 
and Harman both discuss. The most famous of these is the 
inverted spectrum argument, which we will explore last. Let 
us turn to the argument from awareness of qualia during 
experience. This argument takes the following form: When 
one experiences redness or pain, one is aware of an intrinsic 
quality of one’s experience, where “an intrinsic quality is a 
Kaleidoscope | Volume 9, 2010 | The University of Kentucky Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship
quality something has in itself, apart from its relation to other 
things,” (Harman 664). An intrinsic quality of a subject’s 
experience (or a quale) cannot be characterized functionally, 
since functionalism defines mental events in terms of their 
relations to each other, to their physical causes, and to behavior. 
Therefore, functionalism does not offer a complete picture of 
our (conscious) mental activity (Harman). 
 How might an intentionalist respond to this argument? 
Gilbert Harman responds by calling the premise into 
question. In fact, Harman claims that we cannot be aware of 
the intrinsic qualities of our experiences except in special cases 
that do not pose a problem for functionalism; for instance, 
you may be able to become aware of the intrinsic qualities 
of your experiences by observing your own brain in a mirror 
during a surgery (Harman), but this kind of access to the 
intrinsic qualities of your experience occurs from the third 
person perspective, and thus is not the same kind of access 
that phenomenists are talking about. It is important to note 
that access to our qualia, if they exist as defined above, is only a 
challenge for functionalism if it is first person access3. Harman 
claims that we can only be aware of our intentional mental 
content, meaning the objects that are represented and not the 
medium which represents them, although it can be easy to 
confuse the intrinsic quality of the represented object of our 
experience with the intrinsic quality of the experience itself 
(Harman). According to Harman, the premise of the argument 
from awareness falls prey to this confusion. 
 Harman invokes a very clear example to support his case. 
He writes that if you have a pain in your leg, “It is very tempting 
to confuse features of what you experience as happening in 
your leg with the intrinsic features of your experience. But 
the happening in your leg that you are presented with is the 
intentional object of your experience; it is not the experience 
itself ” (668). 
 Harman invokes a useful analogy to showcase this point 
further. When looking at a tree, Eloise is aware of some features 
of her experience, specifically of the fact that her experience 
represents something, and of the intentional content4 that 
her experience represents (a tree). However, while looking at 
a painting of a unicorn, “she can turn her attention to the 
pattern of the paint on the canvas by virtue of which the 
painting represents a unicorn. But in the case of her visual 
experience of a tree, I want to say that she is not aware of, as 
it were, the mental paint by virtue of which her experience 
is an experience of seeing a tree” (667). In another example 
Harman writes, “When one is looking at a red tomato and 
one tries to turn one’s attention to the intrinsic features of 
one’s experience, all that one will be able to do is focus more 
on the object that is represented, that is, the tomato and the 
redness of it.” Both of these points serve to clarify why it is 
impossible, according to Gilbert Harman, to be aware of one’s 
qualia (what he calls the “intrinsic features of experience”).
 While Harman’s objection to the pro-qualia argument from 
awareness may seem like a minor victory for intentionalism 
(and by extension, functionalism), Ned Block attempts a 
defense of its premise in his article, Mental Paint. Block is one 
of the main proponents of phenomenism, and claims not only 
that qualia, intrinsic properties of our experiences, exist, but 
that there are some which represent intentional content, and 
some which accompany it but represent nothing at all. He 
calls the former sub-category of qualia “mental paint” and the 
latter “mental oil” (Block 34). 
 Block argues that Harman is wrong about awareness, 
though not about attention5. He argues that we can be aware 
of qualia, even when we are not attending to them. Block 
writes, “Another way to appreciate the point: stick your finger 
in front of your face, then focus on something distant. It does 
not seem so hard (at least to me) to attend to and be aware of 
aspects of the experience of the finger as well as of the finger” 
(7). However, this is a questionable appeal to intuition and 
introspection. When we perform the above exercise, the way 
the world is represented to us through perception changes, 
and we are aware of this change. We also become aware of 
(that is to say, attend to) certain features of our experience 
because of this change. However, it does not follow that we 
are aware of intrinsic features of our experience beyond those 
that Eloise was aware of in her perception of the tree. If we do 
become aware of some quale, then it is an indirect awareness 
that comes from our discovery of two very different perceptual 
experiences which represent the world differently to us. 
 However, it seems that for Block, the primary question is 
ontological: is there mental paint? Block asks more specifically, 
“is there anything mental in experience over and above its 
representational content?” (Block 7). It seems Harman’s views 
on the awareness issue are not inconsistent with the claim 
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that mental paint might exist, only that we cannot be aware 
of it. In other words, one can infer from Harman’s argument 
that mental paint (if it exists) could never become part of our 
intentional content. (Of course, we will see later that Harman 
attempts to show two other arguments for the existence of 
“mental paint” to be fallacious.) Block claims there is something 
we can call mental paint and mental oil.
 Block tells us one way to see if there is a real issue over 
the existence of mental paint is to consider the inverted 
spectrum scenario, which we will address later (8). Another 
argument for qualia is the knowledge argument. It states that 
“what it is like”6 to experience a quale (to see something red, 
for instance) cannot be explained in purely functional terms 
because a person blind from birth could know all the physical 
and functional facts about color perception without knowing 
what it is actually like to see red (Harman 664). Harman 
attacks this argument by appealing to concepts. He claims 
that the premise is false because knowing what it is like to 
see something red requires your being able to represent red 
to yourself by invoking a concept, R, which a person who has 
never seen red before cannot have (Harman 671). Thus, the 
argument is flawed because its only premise is false. 
 So far, this seems fairly straightforward. However, and 
maybe you could have guessed, Block has an objection to 
this kind of argument. He claims that the intentionalist (he 
calls this the “representationist”) must appeal to color words 
or “recognitional concepts” to make the above argument. In 
other words, the concept above which we dubbed R is either 
a color word (i.e. “red”) or a wordless concept which enables 
one to recognize that (red) color. Block claims that this is a 
problem because someone who grows up in a black and white 
world and is never taught color words can recognize different 
colors when he is exposed to them, presumably because he 
has different phenomenal experiences of them. He claims that 
the representationist has no internal difference to appeal to, 
except one’s knowing color words or recognizing different 
phenomenal characters (16-17). Here, we will delve into a 
brief and relevant digression in order to voice an objection 
to this argument — an objection which is consistent with 
phenomenism.
 Can two people have the same intentional content when 
looking at an object, but have different phenomenal characters 
in their respective experiences? For Block, there are two senses 
of the phrase “looks the same” which need to be clarified. 
In the first case, two people can look at the same object and 
perceive the same color – that is, the object “looks the same” 
to both of them because their experiences represent the object 
as having a certain color. However, there is another sense in 
which the phenomenal character of their experiences differs; 
specifically, their phenomenal characters are inverted. To both 
people, a given object (say, a ripe strawberry) appears red, but 
for one person the experience feels the way it feels for the other 
to look at the color of a jalapeno pepper. Here is the passage: 
   In what Shoemaker (1981) calls the intentional 
   sense of ‘looks the same’, the [aquamarine] chips  
   look the same  (in respect of color) to Jack and Jill 
   just in case both of their perceptual experiences 
   represent it as having the same color. So I agree 
   with the objection that there is a sense of ‘looks 
   the same’ in which the aquamarine chip does 
   look the same to Jack and Jill. But where I disagree 
   with the objection is that I recognize another sense 
   of ‘looks the same’, (the qualitative or phenomenal 
   sense) a sense geared to phenomenal character, 
   in which we have reason to think that the   
   aquamarine chip does not look the same to 
   Jack as to Jill (Block 29).
 Now that we recognize Block’s two meanings of the phrase 
“looks the same,” we are in a position to argue against his 
objection regarding color concepts. Surely, one can recognize 
objects of different colors because they “look” different in 
the first sense of the word, meaning that one’s experience 
represents the objects as having certain respective colors-
this object appears red, that object appears blue. We do not 
need the second sense of “looking” (that is, our feeling which is 
accompanied by something appearing a certain way) in order 
to distinguish between our experience of red and our experience of 
blue. In other words, we do not need to talk of distinguishing 
between our phenomenal experiences in order to talk of color 
concepts, only of our perception of different colors. It seems 
Block has undone his own argument by making a distinction 
which is critical for phenomenism. 
 The final pro-qualia argument to be discussed here is 
the inverted spectrum. According to this hypothesis, it is 
metaphysically possible that two people could be functionally 
alike in all ways, but things that look red to one person 
look green to another, things that look yellow to one person 
look blue to another, and so on. Since these people are 
functionally alike but have different phenomenal experiences, 
functionalism does not give a complete account of our mental 
life (Harman 671). The inverted spectrum scenario is taken 
to reference Block’s first meaning of “looking”, that is, colors 
literally appearing inverted with respect to different people. 
     Can two people have the same 
intentional content when looking at an 
object, but have different phenomenal 
characters in their respective experiences?
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The people who are inverted with respect to one another still 
use colors words in the same way, so their spectrum inversion 
is behaviorally undetectable.
 There are some consequences that accompany the scenario 
depicted above. First, let us note that, “in the case of normal 
perception, there can be no distinction between how things 
look and how they are believed to be” (Harman 672). Harman 
points out that if two people are inverted with respect to each 
other, they will have different beliefs about the color of any 
given object. As a result, they must mean something different 
by their color words. However, “According to functionalism, 
if [two people] use words in the same way with respect to the 
same things, then they mean the same things by those words 
[. . .]. Some sort of philosophical argument is needed to argue 
otherwise. No such argument has been provided by defenders 
of the inverted spectrum” (673). This is an interesting and 
controversial point. We will see how it resurfaces in the next 
thought experiment.
 There is another scenario related to the inverted spectrum 
called Inverted Earth. In the latter case, the same person’s 
phenomenal characters stay the same while the externalist 
representational content changes7. Inverted Earth is a 
place where “everything is the complementary color of the 
corresponding earth object. The sky is yellow, the grass-like 
stuff is red, etc. Second, people on Inverted Earth speak an 
inverted language. They use ‘red’ to mean green, ‘blue’ to 
mean yellow, and so forth” (Block 20). Additionally, if the 
wires in your brain were switched around, you would notice 
no difference upon your arrival on Inverted Earth. This is very 
important, because when you arrive and look at the grass, 
which is really red, and say something like, “What beautifully 
green grass!” Here, Block claims that you are wrong; it is only 
until you decide to adopt the language of Inverted Earth 
that your color words represent your experiences correctly8. 
According to Block, 
   “...after you have decided to adopt the concepts   
   and language of the Inverted Earth language  
   community and you have been there for 50 years, 
   your word ‘red’ and the representational content 
   of your experience as of red things (things that are 
   really red) will shift so that you  represent them 
   correctly. Then, your words will mean the same as 
   those of the members of your adopted language 
   community and your visual experience will 
   represent colors veridically” (20). 
 This means that you will come to believe that ripe 
tomatoes are green, that the sky is yellow, and so on. In Block’s 
revised version of Inverted Earth, there are two consequences 
of the Inverted Earth thought experiment. “The phenomenal 
character of your color experience stays the same. That’s what 
you say, and why shouldn’t we believe you? [. . .] But the 
representational content of your experience, being externalist, 
shifts with external conditions in the environment” (21). This 
argument has been the most difficult for the intentionalist to 
topple. However, in his article, “Inverted Earth, Swampman, 
and Representationism,” Michael Tye offers a fierce objection 
to Block’s inverted earth argument. Tye defends an externalist 
approach to memory and claims that the subject’s claim that 
his or her phenomenal experience on Earth and Inverted 
Earth are the same relies on an assumption about the accuracy 
of memory which can legitimately be called into question. In 
short, Tye claims that because we have good reason to doubt 
our memories of phenomenal experience (party because 
remembering is unlike looking at a photograph, where all the 
represented content is shown accurately), the Inverted Earth 
argument does not offer a serious objection to functionalism. 
In fact, it cannot even show us that qualia (“mental paint”) 
must exist. 
 By now, it should be evident that the phenomenist’s 
only way to defend the existence of qualia rests on suspicious 
assumptions about memory. Then again, one could attempt 
a philosophical defense of why two people who are inverted 
with respect to each other use the same color words, but mean 
different things. However, it is doubtful that this argument 
alone could warrant a theory about the phenomenal content 
of consciousness.  
1 In philosophy of mind, supervenience denotes a kind of dependency 
 relationship between mental and physical phenomena. According to 
 the supervenience thesis, there is an asymmetry between the mental 
 and the physical, which results from the fact that possession of the 
 former depends on possession of the latter. See Heil’s or Kim’s 
 Philosophy of Mind for further explanation.
2  Epiphenomenalism presents the view that the mental is only an 
 effect of physical underpinnings; while mental processes may seem 
 causally efficacious to us, they are in fact causally inert in every way 
 (Heil 185).
3  The issue of first person access originated long before the qualia 
 debate entered the scene of philosophy of mind. However, it is 
 particularly important here because in order to make a strong case 
 for qualia, one may need to invoke first person awareness of them. 
    “According to functionalism, if 
[two people] use words in the same way 
with respect to the same things, then they 
mean the same things by those words [. . .]. 
Some sort of philosophical argument 
is needed to argue otherwise. No such 
argument has been provided by defenders 
of the inverted spectrum” (673).
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 For instance, if I am experiencing something red, I must be aware of 
 the redness (the intentional content of my experience) and of the 
 way this content is represented to me. The question is, even if 
 the latter is possible, does it pose problems for functionalism? In 
 other words, is my awareness of the vehicle of representation 
 intentional or phenomenal?
4 What is intentional (or representational) content? In perception, 
 it is the way our world is represented to us. For instance, a ripe 
 strawberry is represented as of a certain hue, value, and intensity 
 (we generally just say it is represented as red). There are other forms 
 of intentional content, but they do not have to correspond to 
 something actual. For instance, I could have a hallucination of an 
 image or, like Ponce de Leon, search Florida for the Fountain of 
 Youth; in both cases, my intentional content does not refer to 
 something actually in the world (Harman 664).
5 Here, it is important to clarify the difference between awareness and 
 attention. Imagine having a conversation in your living room, when 
 you hear the air conditioning turn off in your house. When this 
 happens, you suddenly recognize that you were aware of the 
 humming sound produced by the system, the whole time although 
 you were not attending to it while you were talking with your friend. 
 Or, to use Block’s example: “For example, one might be involved 
 in intense conversation while a jackhammer outside causes one to 
 raise one’s voice without ever noticing or attending to the noise until 
 someone comments on it-at which time one realizes that one was 
 aware of it all along” (Block 7).
6 “What it is like” has become a common phrase which denotes 
 phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. It is borrowed 
 from Thomas Nagel’s influential article, “What Is It Like To Be a 
 Bat?”
7 Block discusses this scenario in some detail in his paper, “Mental 
 Paint,” although he also wrote an article called “Inverted Earth.”
8 Why does Block say that you are wrong in calling the grass green, 
 even though you experience it the same way you experienced grass on 
 the real Earth (because your “wires” are switched)? He claims that it 
 is for the same reason you are wrong to call Twin Earth water “water” 
 in Hilary Putnam’s famous thought experiment (Block 20).
9  For further reading on this issue, see Tye’s “Inverted Earth, 
 Swampman, and Representationism,” and specifically section II of 
 this article on Block’s assumptions regarding memory.
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